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This paper investigates whether disparity in team member quality impacts team
production using NCAA 4x400m relay teams. The net peer effects are estimated to have both an
absolute and relative negative effect on the team performance. Because NCAA relay teams are
comprised of unpaid amateurs, we utilize a direct measure of team-member quality rather than
indirect measures such as wages. The evidence suggests that a greater disparity in team member
quality reduces team performance, that is, it increases a relay team’s running time. This suggests
that net negative peer effects exist and support the “team cohesiveness hypothesis” for NCAA
relay teams.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a sport such as track and field, athletes are often primarily judged and therefore concerned 
with their own performance. However, in many cases, a high quality track and field athlete 
competes in numerous different events during a meet, some as an individual and others as a 
member of a team. Those instances in which an athlete is asked to compete on a team pose a 
potential moral hazard problem because increased effort during a team event might put them at a 
disadvantage in an individual competition.  
This paper investigates whether positive or negative peer effects exist on 4x400m relay 
teams in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I track and field. To assess 
whether relay teams experience peer effects, we estimate various empirical models that relate a 
team’s absolute and relative performance to the average quality of its members, the standard 
deviation of its members’ quality, the type of season, the type of race, the number of different 
runners on the team from the previous race, and the year of the race.  
The results suggest that as the average team member quality ranking increases, team time 
decreases, i.e., absolute team performance improves. However, as the standard deviation of the 
team members’ rankings increases, team time increases, i.e., absolute team performance 
decreases. We also find evidence that average quality improves a team’s relative performance 
but disparity of quality reduces a team’s relative performance. Furthermore, changing runners 
from race to race significantly reduces team performance.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The difference between a team and individual production function is that a team’s production 
function is more than just the “summing up” of the individual team members’ production  
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functions. Instead, teams produce a combined output, where “there is a source of gain from 
cooperative activity involving working as a team, wherein individual cooperating inputs do not 
yield identifiable, separate products which can be summed to measure the total output” (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972, 779). Although in many cases the output of a team will be greater than it 
would from the individuals working on their own, a team also has to deal with internal issues that 
the individual does not. These issues can affect the performance of workers dramatically, and can 
have positive or negative effects on the output of the team. Positive peer effects include 
knowledge transfers, increased esprit de corps, and improved marginal products. Negative peer 
effects, which exist if the output of worker i systematically decreases the output of worker j and 
vice versa, include problems such as jealousy, free riding, and shirking (Falk and Ichino, 2006). 
Much of the existing literature in this area focuses on moral hazard and how 
uncooperative behavior amongst workers yields inefficient levels of output (Holmström, 1982). 
It is often assumed that by separating ownership and labor, the moral hazard problem can be 
resolved by more easily confirming what each team member contributes to total output. 
To accomplish this, the ability to monitor workers is paramount. As suggested by 
Grossman and Hart (1983), the incentive to shirk will increase as monitoring can becomes more 
costly or infeasible. An alternative is to have employees monitor each other, which Barron and 
Gjerde (1997) coin a “peer pressure environment;” a combination of employee-provided 
standards, monitoring, and sanctions accepted and understood by workers before they each 
determine their individual levels of effort helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem. However, 
since a worker does not earn a higher payment when discovering the lazy behavior of another 
worker, she will only exert monitoring effort to the point where the “marginal gain of detection 
activity” equals “the marginal cost of detection” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This, in turn,  
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implies less productive effort and greater shirking than when monitoring is costless. Moreover, 
even if a team member knows another team member is not doing as much as he could, it might 
not be in her best interest to tell the manager about this behavior even though it decreases team 
performance. If the person shirking is better than an alternative (non-shirking) team member, 
then it might be better to keep the shirking member on the team. 
Team externalities exist when an individual’s performance cannot be completely and 
accurately measured. Team externalities cause all workers to share credit or blame equally, 
which augments the incentive to shirk (Drago and Turnbull, 1988). A lower effort by one 
individual might decrease overall team output, the blame for which is shared by all team 
members. This, in turn, motivates other team members to decrease their level of effort.  
Problems can also occur if a conflict of interest exists, i.e., the objectives of individual 
workers are not the same as the objectives of the team (Groves 1973). A relay teams can be 
compared to a conglomerate, considering each team member a separate unit and the coach as the 
central administration. In this model, the team members are linked only through the coach, and 
might not agree with all the decisions made for them by the coach. For example, their opinion 
about maximum performance or racing decisions might not be the same as that of the coach. 
Therefore, it might be in the team members’ interest to lie or give the coach imperfect 
information, thereby making it easier to shirk. However, this is likely less of a problem at 
schools with great team spirit or a strong history in a certain event, such as the 4x400m relay, 
where team members have a common goal, and the athletes who go there do so because they 
want to be part of that particular team. 
Along with the problem of incentives is the concern of how the workers should be 
compensated. Lazear and Rosen (1981) suggest that when “inexpensive and reliable monitors of  
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effort are available, the best compensation scheme is a periodic wage based on input.” On the 
other hand, when monitoring becomes a problem, workers should be paid based on rank order, 
that is on their relative position in the organization. This second alternative is usually how track 
athletes within NCAA are compensated, that is, based on their relative rank or performance 
within the team as a whole. Those student athletes with a full scholarship should generally those 
who score the most points during events and can qualify for the regional and national 
championships.  
Another topic discussed in the context of negative peer effects and moral hazard is the 
allocation of workers. Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) suggest that when spillovers are 
significant, workers should be sorted and grouped according to ability: high-quality workers 
should be teamed with other high-quality workers. The only problem in this situation is how to 
sort these common groups so that output is maximized. 
The confidence in other team members is based on how much trust there is between the 
members. Trust can help a team by increasing the information available to the principal and the 
other team members (Jones and George, 1998). This can give rise to better cooperation and 
improved performance. Teams with strong team spirit have a strong advantage in these 
circumstances as “shared values result in strong desire to cooperate, even at personal expense” 
(Jones and George, 1998). Sports teams try to encourage a strong sense of team spirit and loyalty 
so that team members want to be part of the team and no one wants to shirk. Indeed, this focus 
on team spirit can cause managers to “over invest” in training athletes and cause “reverse 
shirking” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  
Even though athletes under NCAA Division I are considered amateur athletes and do not 
receive monetary wages for their performance, in many ways NCAA sports teams are similar to  
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professional sports teams. As pointed out by Carmichael, Thomas and Ward (2000), “[i]n many 
sports, the isolation and identification of individual contributions is problematic, if not 
impossible, due to the continuously interactive nature of a match or game.” This can make it 
difficult to estimate whether positive or negative net peer effects exist in a team environment.  
Since peer effects can be hard to measure directly, an alternative approach is necessary. 
Depken (2000), and several authors following his example, have investigated the whether the 
quality of professional sports teams responds to the level and disparity of player salaries. The 
team-cohesiveness hypothesis (Levine, 1991) posits that wage disparity will reduce team 
productivity by inciting jealousy and less cooperation amongst team members. On the other 
hand, the danger potential hypothesis (Ramaswamy and Rowthorne, 1991) is essentially an 
efficiency wage argument and suggests that those workers whose shirking can cause the greatest 
damage to team output should be paid the most, i.e., wage disparity should be correlated with 
increased team productivity.  
In professional baseball, Depken found that a higher disparity in wages on led to a 
reduction in team performance. Other authors have confirmed this result in baseball but have 
shown that the danger potential hypothesis might prevail in other sports.  
The main difference between the current study and those in professional sports is the lack 
of formal wages in the NCAA; athletes are instead given an in-kind payment. Therefore, rather 
than look at the impact of the remuneration pattern on team output, we focus directly on the 
inputs to team productivity. That is, we test if greater disparity in worker quality leads to a 




3. NCAA RELAY TEAM PERFORMANCE AND PEER EFFECTS 
The performance of a relay team, measured in time, can be considered a function of the actual 
performance of the four runners on the team, where each runner’s performance Ai is a function of 
runner’s quality, Qi, and the quality of the other team members, Q~i. That is, the team production 
function can be defined as ε + = )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( 4 3 2 1 Q A Q A Q A Q A f Time , where Ai is the actual 
output of team member i and Q=[Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4] is a vector of each team member’s expected 
quality, and ε  is a random error term. The partial effect of Qj on Ai reflects the peer effects of 
runner j on runner i. The net influence of the combination of peer effects on runner i’s actual 
production can be positive or negative. A net positive peer effect will induce the team member to 
run faster, whereas negative peer effects would induce the runner to run slower. In this study, I 
will only be able to estimate a reduced form of the net impact of peer effects on a team level. 
That is, I cannot identify how any particular runner influences the other runners on the team.  
A coach can try to improve the performance of a team by changing the combination of 
the team members, and replacing one runner with a runner of higher quality. In this case, the 
coach is hoping to get a reduction in the team’s time by changing the j




































 reflects positive or negative peer effects of team 
member j on team member i. The actual impact of changing a runner can be positive or negative 
depending on the peer effects caused by the change in quality of the j
th team member.  
If an increase in quality improves the aggregate performance of the team members, this 
would mean that the team members responded positively to the new combination of runners, and  
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the time of the relay would decrease. Here, the gains from improved quality would be greater 
than any negative effects experienced by any of the other runners. On the other hand, if the 
actual performance of the team decreases after the change of team members, despite any increase 
in quality, then there are negative peer effects that reduce team output.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA 
To test for positive or negative peer effects we control for both the average and the standard 
deviation of team member quality. If the standard deviation is found to have an insignificant 
relationship with team output, this would suggest that there are no net peer effects caused by 
disparity of team member quality. If the standard deviation is significant and positive, this would 
suggest the existence of net negative peer effects; the greater the disparity of talent on a relay 
team the worse the team performs, ceteris paribus. The team production function estimated 
model specified as: 






ε γ β β β
β β β β β β
+ ⋅ + + + +
+ + + + + =
YEAR NUMDIFF PRELIMS FINALS
OUTDOORS SDRANK SDRANK AVERANK AVERANK TIME
         (1) 
where the dependent variable, TIME, is the number of seconds a relay team runs the 4x400m, the 
β’s are parameters to be estimated and ε is a zero-mean error term.  
The explanatory variables include the average ranking of a particular team’s members, 
AVERANK, and its quadratic; the standard deviation of the team member’s ranking, SDRANK, 
and its quadratic; the number of different runners on the team compared to the previous race, 
NUMDIFF; and control variables for whether the race was held outdoors rather than indoors, 
OUTDOORS, and whether the race was an NCAA championship finals or NCAA championship 
preliminary, FINALS and PRELIMS, respectively.  
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 The variable AVERANK is expected to have an inverse relationship with time, that is, a 
one unit increase in the average ranking of the team members will result in a faster time. The 
parameter SDRANK, on the other hand, could be either positive or negative since the range of the 
ranking on the team can result from any combination of runners. The team could include three 
average runners and one all-star, or it could be three all-star and one average runner. However, 
when comparing two teams with the same average ranking, the sign of the parameter on 
SDRANK provides evidence as to whether the average team suffers from negative peer effects, 
ceteris paribus.  
The parameter NUMDIFF is expected to have a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable. The more runners that have been part of a particular team over the year, the slower the 
time will be as the team members will have less confidence and trust in each other. The variables 
controlling for race conditions the type of race of a particular observation are expected to have an 
inverse relationship with time compared to their respective reference categories 
To test for possible negative peer effects, three different approaches are taken. First, the 
basic specification given in equation (1) is estimated using robust ordinary least squares. To 
determine whether a team is under-performing or over-performing given its inputs, we create a 
measure of predicted team quality and compare that to the team’s actual quality; the difference is 
used to test whether peer effects reduce team effectiveness in a relative rather than an absolute 
sense. Finally, we estimate a model wherein the dependent variable takes a value of one if the 
team is found to be under-performing. This last model allows us to test whether certain variables 
influence the probability that a team will under-perform.  
The data describe 305 teams running twenty-four different 4x400m relay races at NCAA 
Division I regional and NCAA championship track and field meets from 2002 through 2006. To  
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make sure that all team members would be individually ranked, we only included results from 
the NCAA Regional meets and NCAA Championship meets, which all have qualifying 
standards. For the regional meet and the indoor championship, only finals take place, whereas in 
the outdoor championship, teams run both prelims and finals.  
Each team member’s national ranking, as generated by Trackshark.com, is converted to 
the point system used by the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF), where 
each runner’s season-best time is worth a certain amount of points. All times on the ranking lists 
were converted to a non-banked 200m track at sea-level even if the runner raced on a banked or 
over-long track or if they were at high altitude. The points for all four team members are used to 
determine the mean and standard deviation of quality for each team.  
Only teams on which all players were individually ranked are included in the sample. By 
only including teams with all players ranked, 928 observations were deleted, that is, 232 teams, 
leaving me with 292 observations (73 teams). However, of those 73 teams, three of them did not 
have an official time from the race. That is, they were either disqualified during the race, or did 
not start the race at all. Therefore, these observations were dropped from the sample. The final 
sample is comprised of 280 observations for 70 teams.
1 Variable definitions and sources are 
provided in Table 1 and the sample descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical results for three different models are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. The first 
model entails robust OLS on the empirical specification provided in equation (1) above.
2 The 
                                                 
1 This does introduce the possibility of sample selection bias. We hope to address this issue in the future. 
2 A White test statistic was 267.73 with a p-value of 0.000.  
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reduced form parameters are all statistically significant at the 1% level except for the standard 
deviation of team member quality, which is significant at the 5% level.  
The results from the regression output for the basic OLS model reflect the absolute effect 
of the disparity on team performance. As the average quality of the athletes on a team increases, 
the team’s time drops, i.e., the relay team runs faster. However, the returns to average quality are 
diminishing, as reflected in the positive parameter estimate on AVERANKSQ.
3 A scatter plot of 
TIME against the average team quality (AVERANK) in Figure 1 confirms the non-linear 
relationship between team performance and average team member quality.  
The impact of quality disparity on team performance is negative. Having a greater 
disparity of quality amongst team members increases a team’s time suggesting net negative peer 
effects from quality disparity. However, there is a non-linear relationship between disparity and 
team performance, as the scatter plot of TIME against SDRANK in Figure 2 confirms. There is a 
sufficient level of quality disparity at which point the performance of the team will actually 
improve, ceteris paribus. This suggests that a team with one or two very high quality runners can 
perform better than a the team comprised of four relatively similar runners.  
To be a bit more specific about the results, the estimates indicate that a one unit increase 
in the average team member ranking reduces the time by 1.83 seconds, whereas an increase in 
the average ranking squared increases time by 0.001 seconds. Running a race outdoors reduces 
time by 3.54 seconds, ceteris paribus. Preliminary times are 2.24 seconds faster on average than 
regional races, ceteris paribus, and final races are 3.86 seconds faster on average than regional 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 The hypothesis that the two variables, AVERANK and AVERANKSQ, are jointly equal to zero is rejected with an F-
test statistic of 64.42 and a p-value of 0.0000.  
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races, ceteris paribus. Finally, each replaced team member team from race to race increases time 
by 0.83 seconds, ceteris paribus. 
As a robustness check, Model (1) in Table 1 was re-estimated including an additional 
variable, ALLSTAR, which takes a value of one if the team has an all-star. This was done to 
check whether an all-star on the team changes the parameter of the standard deviation of the 
team members’ ranking since an all-star definitely would increase the range of the runners’ 
quality. The variable ALLSTAR takes a value of one if any team member’s quality was one and a 
half standard deviations above the mean quality in the sample; thirty-two of the runners qualified 
as all-stars. However, the interactions of the variable with the average and standard deviation of 
quality proved insignificant. We conclude from this that having all-stars on relay teams provides 
no additional net peer effects, positive or negative. The constant variable is only an intercept 
term, and will therefore not bring too much information to the analysis. Yet, based on the 
assumption that all other variables are zero, the time for the relay would be about 1249.47 
seconds, which would be a time over 20 minutes. 
The standard deviation of the team members’ ranking has a positive relationship with 
time; a one-unit increase in the standard deviation of team member rankings corresponded with 
an increase the time of 0.06 seconds, ceteris paribus. However, the negative effects of quality 
disparity are diminishing; a one-unit increase in the standard deviation squared decreases the 
time of the relay with 0.007 seconds, ceteris paribus. 
There is some concern that the results in Model (1) suffer from an omitted variable bias, 
specifically unmeasured team-specific heterogeneity such as coaching, training, and team spirit. 
We re-estimated the model including team fixed effects; the results are reported in Model (2) in  
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Table 3.
4 Having controlled for team-fixed effects, the parameter estimates on SDRANK and 
SDRANKSQ have the same sign and remain significant as does the parameter estimate for 
NUMDIFF. These results show that the net negative peer effects on the relay teams remain even 
after controlling for issues such as coaching ability and program history. The estimated team 
fixed-effects are reported in Table 4. As can be seen, only ten out of the twenty fixed effects are 
statistically different from zero.  
Having established that disparity of quality reduces team productivity in an absolute 
sense, it of interest whether disparity of quality reduces team productivity in a relative sense. To 
test this, we converted the time each team actually ran into a set of points, using the same 
conversion table as for the individual rankings, and subtracted the average ranking of the team. 
The resultant variable, DPERF, measures the difference in actual performance from expected 
performance of a particular team. Using DPERF as the dependent variable allows us to test 
whether race and team characteristics correlate with teams over or under achieving.   
Model (3) and Model (4) report robust OLS results using DPERF as the dependent 
variable, Model (4) includes team fixed effects. In this specification, all of the main variables are 
again significant at the 5% level, and 8 of the 20 teams have statistically significant fixed effects. 
The results suggest that a marginal change in average quality improves relative team 
performance, but that team member disparity reduces a team’s relative performance. This means 
that a greater disparity in team member quality, the average team performs worse than its 
average quality rating would predict. This provides strong evidence for the existence of negative 
peer effects created by disparity of team member quality.  
                                                 
4 The reference team in this model is Arizona State University.  
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The final specification is to estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable, 
UNDERPERF, takes a value of one if the team under-performed and zero otherwise. The results 
from the probit model shows that the greater the average quality the lower the probability of a 
team underperforming (see column (5) of Table 3). However, in this case, the disparity of team 
member quality doesn’t correspond with a statistically significant increase in the probability that 
a team will under-perform. However, if the variable NUMDIFF is removed, the standard 
deviation and its quadratic again become significant. This suggests that the negative peer effects 
generated by replacement players alone rather than any change in quality disparity that arises 
from replacement runners might dominate.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper shows that a disparity in team member quality reduces the performance of 
NCAA men’s 4x400m relay teams. We associate this reduction in team productivity to negative 
peer effects. Starting with a basic OLS model, we find that team relay time is positively related 
to average quality but negatively related to the standard deviation in quality. Further, teams that 
change runners from one race to the next suffer a reduction in team performance. The results are 
robust to including team fixed-effects and strongly suggest that there are net negative peer effects 
associated with team member quality disparity.  
We also investigate whether average quality and the disparity of quality impact the 
relative performance of a team, that is, is a team’s actual time faster or slower than would be 
predicted given their average quality. The results suggest that the net negative peer effects 
impact the relative performance of a team in addition to the absolute performance.  
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Finally, we relate the various race and team characteristics to a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the team underperformed. This model shows that a marginal change in the 
average quality decreases the probability that the team under-performs, but the standard 
deviation of team member quality only increases the odds that a team underperforms if the 
number of different runners from one race to the next is dropped from the model.  
These results suggest that greater disparity in team member quality increases NCAA 
relay team times, which suggests the existence of negative peer effects. These negative peer 
effects can arise because of free riding or shirking, but could also arise from other non-monetary 
reasons such as jealousy, mistrust, or a lack of familiarity. The results add to the literature 
investigating the impact of wage disparities on team performance and offers further support to 




Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description  Source 
TIME  The final time of the 4x400m relay (seconds)  Trackshark.com 
AVERANK  The average quality of the team Trackshark.com  &  IAAF.org 
AVERANKSQ  The average quality squared  Authors’ calculations 
SDRANK  The standard deviation of the team members’ quality  Authors’ calculations 
SDRANKSQ  The standard deviation squared  Authors’ calculations 
OUTDOORS  The race is run outdoors  Trackshark.com 
INDOORS  The race is run indoors  Trackshark.com 
FINALS  The race is a final race  Trackshark.com & NCAA.com 
PRELIMS  The race is a prelim race  Trackshark.com & NCAA.com 
REGIONALS  The race is a regional race  Trackshark.com & NCAA.com 
NUMDIFF  The number of different runners on a particular team 
from one race to the other 
Authors’ calculations 
DRANK  The difference between the actual quality and the 
expected quality of the team 
IAAF.org, and authors’ 
calculations 
UNDERPERF  The difference between the actual and expected 
quality of the team is negative 
Authors’ calculations 
ALLSTAR  A runner’s ranking is more than one and a half 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
TIME 185.115  3.654  179.59  202.43 
AVERANK 1109.581  30.206  1051.75  1174.375 
AVERANKSQ 1232079 67342.12 1106178 1379157 
SDRANK 35.653  15.498  11.247  74.293 
SDRANKSQ 1510.535  1224.271 126.5  5519.5 
OUTDOORS 0.957 0.202  0  1 
INDOORS 0.042  0.202 0  1 
FINALS 0.342  0.475  0  1 
PRELIMS 0.3  0.459  0 1 
REGIONALS 0.357  0.480  0  1 
NUMDIFF 0.685  0.995 0  4 
DRANK -1.25  46.200  -231.375  59.187 
UNDERPERF 0.471  0.500  0  1 




Table 3: Estimation Results 
 


















AVERANK -1.834  -3.512  26.553 51.631  -1.043  -0.416 
 (4.72)**  (7.68)**  (4.55)**  (7.30)**  (3.90)**   
AVERANKSQ 0.001  0.002  -0.012  -0.023  0.000  0.000 
 (4.55)**  (7.55)**  (4.55)**  (7.32)**  (3.95)**   
SDRANK 0.061  0.196  -0.888  -2.846 0.009 0.004 
 (2.21)*  (4.89)**  (2.17)**  (3.63)**  (0.46)   
SDRANKSQ -0.001 -0.002 0.011  0.026  -0.000  0.000 
 (2.32)*  (3.27)**  (2.33)**  (3.20)**  (1.77)   
OUTDOORS -3.544 -2.831  -46.920 -58.610     
 (4.99)**  (3.59)**  (4.39)**  (4.90)**     
FINALS -3.861  -2.940  59.201 45.594  -2.407  -0.723 
b 
 (9.91)**  (8.70)**  (10.12)**  (10.44)**  (6.57)**   
PRELIMS -2.241  -1.945  33.743 29.478  -1.184  -0.435
 b 
 (6.56)**  (6.93)**  (6.64)**  (7.38)**  (5.24)**   
NUMDIFF 0.831  0.761  -12.345  -11.270  0.455  0.181 
 (4.77)**  (5.45)**  (4.81)**  (6.18)**  (5.07)**   
YEAR 2003  -3.064  -3.964  45.903  58.525  -6.942  -0.694
 b 
 (5.33)**  (3.63)**  (5.36)*  (3.48)**  (14.50)   
YEAR 2004  -4.023  -5.807  61.281  87.081  -7.014  -0.985
 b 
 (8.27)**  (5.42)**  (8.37)**  (5.70)**  (17.36)   
YEAR 2005  -4.516  -6.254  68.666  93.864  -7.160  -0.997
 b 
 (8.52)**  (6.01)**  (8.82)**  (5.51)**  (18.57)   
YEAR 2006  -4.111  -4.854  62.416  72.537  -7.712  -0.945
 b 
 (8.29)**  (4.47)**  (8.55)**  (4.66)**  (18.38)   
CONSTANT 1,249.478  2,182.171  -14,788.200  -28,724.673  581.119   
 (5.79)**  (8.55)**  (4.57)**  (7.28)**  (3.90)   
Observations 280  280  280  280  268  268 
R-squared 0.59  0.81  0.44  0.74     
F-test/ X²-test    34.57  17.47  22.75  150.88   
Dependent variable reported in parentheses in second row. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%. 
a Outdoors 
dropped; predicts failure perfectly. 
b Is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Absolute value of t-
statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4: Team Fixed Effects 
 
 (2) 
Team Fixed Effects 
(4) 
Team Fixed Effects 
Baylor -0.960 14.427 
 (1.16)  (1.01) 
Brigham Young   1.982  -30.113 
 (2.63)**  (2.22)** 
Clemson -1.666  23.673 
 (1.29)  (1.60) 
Florida 1.105 -16.686 
 (1.99)*  (1.38) 
Georgetown -0.937  13.940 
 (0.78)  (1.06) 
Hampton 3.118  -46.618 
 (3.19)**  (2.61)** 
Illinois 6.814 -98.641 
 (8.42)**  (3.62)** 
Kentucky 1.584  -22.812 
 (1.42)  (1.53) 
LSU -1.273  19.994 
 (2.11)*  (1.92) 
Minnesota -0.142  2.475 
 (0.20)  (0.19) 
Mississippi State  -0.302  4.731 
 (0.40)  (0.35) 
Nebraska 3.121  -44.431 
 (2.29)*  (2.70)* 
Oregon -0.862 13.782 
 (1.17)  (0.96) 
Sam Houston State  -6.215  92.994 
 (4.44)**  (6.12)** 
South Carolina  -1.060  15.537 
 (1.55)  (1.21) 
TCU 0.851  -12.370 
 (1.04)  (0.86) 
Texas Tech  1.963  -28.498 
 (2.96)**  (1.89)** 
UCLA 3.122  -48.301 
 (4.30)**  (3.59)** 
USC -2.111  31.525 
 (2.48)*  (2.57)* 
Reference Team: Arizona State University * Significant at 5% ** Significant at 1% Model 
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